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IN RE SIMON SHIAO TAM, A CONCURRING OPINION: 
SECTION 1052(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT IMPOSES AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION NO LONGER JUSTIFIED 
BY CONGRESS’ SPENDING POWER 
Francis A. Raso* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Simon Shiao Tam is the lead singer, songwriter, and “front-man” 
of an Asian American rock band that controversially refers to itself as 
“The Slants.”1  Mr. Tam seeks federal trademark registration for the 
moniker, which he regularly utilizes in promotional materials.2  His 
stated intent is a desire to recapture the negative stereotypes typically 
associated with Asian American culture, and to redefine them in a 
more positive light—as sources of Asian pride and accomplishment.3  
But Mr. Tam’s efforts to seek semiotic change were thwarted when an 
examining attorney in the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) refused to register his mark because the term would likely 
disparage a “substantial composite” of the Asian American 
population.4  The examining attorney cited § 1052(a) of the Lanham 
 
* J.D., 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Journalism and Public 
Relations, 2013, Seton Hall University.  I would like to thank Professor Thomas Healy 
for lending me his constitutional expertise and providing me with valuable feedback 
throughout the writing of this Comment.  I would also like to thank Kyle Brown for all 
of his helpful guidance and encouragement.  
 1  In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).  
 2  See id. 
 3  See id. at 570.  Mr. Tam is one of dozens of trademark applicants who have set 
forth similar reasoning in support of their potentially disparaging trademarks. See 
Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. Murphy, Calling Bullshit on the Lanham Act: The 2(a) 
Bar for Immoral, Scandalous, and Disparaging Marks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 476–
77 (2011) (“Currently, there are many groups attempting to take once derogatory 
terms and internalize them, make them their own, and in the process strip them of 
hateful meaning.”); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the 
Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 219 (2005) (describing “semiotic sovereignty,” a process by 
which disenfranchised communities seek empowerment by transforming offensive 
pejoratives into symbols of pride).  
 4  See Tam, 785 F.3d at 568–69.   
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Act as statutory grounds for the refusal.5 
Section 1052(a) allows the PTO to refuse to register a trademark 
consisting of “immoral,” “disparaging,” or “scandalous” subject 
matter.6  The PTO frequently cites this provision when declining to 
register the marks of applicants who strive to combat prejudice by 
using their products and/or services to redefine cultural stereotypes.7  
Prior to In re Tam, the longstanding Federal Circuit precedent of In re 
McGinley upheld the constitutionality of § 1052(a) against First 
Amendment challenge, reasoning that the PTO’s refusal to grant 
trademark registration does not infringe upon an applicant’s First 
Amendment right to nevertheless use the mark in commerce.8  The 
McGinley decision has since been the subject of widespread, biting 
criticism.9 
Mr. Tam appealed the PTO’s decision, and the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the examiner’s refusal, citing 
dictionary definitions, other reference works, and reactions from the 
community as evidence of likely disparagement.10  The Federal Circuit 
initially reaffirmed the Board’s decision, but subsequently vacated its 
 
 5  Id. at 568. 
 6  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2015). 
 7  See, e.g., In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (rejecting 
registration of the mark, “HEEB,” despite the fact that the founders of Heeb Magazine—
a monthly periodical aimed primarily at Jewish readers—hoped to “revitalize American 
Jewish life” and “transvalue the term ‘heeb’ from an epithet into a term of Jewish 
empowerment”).  In 2003, a PTO examiner rejected the San Francisco Women’s 
Motorcycle Contingent’s application for the proposed mark “DYKES ON BIKES” on 
grounds that the mark would likely offend members of the lesbian community.  U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78281746 (filed July 31, 2003).  Since as early as 
1976, this group has actively participated in countless parades and other events 
promoting homosexual pride. Id. 
 8  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 9  See, e.g., Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., 
dissenting); Stephen Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the 
Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 685–86 
(1993); Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: 
Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 415, 443–44 (2001); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction 
on Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS L. J. 65, 66–67 
(1997); Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality: Proposing Thin Protection of 
Controversial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 67–68 (2008); Jendi Reiter, 
Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally 
Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 197 (1996); see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1333–34 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (“[T]he McGinley analysis was cursory . . . and decided 
at a time when the First Amendment had only recently been applied to commercial 
speech.  First Amendment jurisprudence on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
and the protection accorded to commercial speech has evolved significantly since the 
McGinley decision.”).  
 10  Tam, 785 F.3d at 569. 
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judgment and granted Mr. Tam a rehearing en banc on the sole issue: 
Does § 1052(a) violate the First Amendment?11 
Upon rehearing, the Federal Circuit vacated its earlier judgment, 
partially overruled McGinley, struck down § 1052(a)’s disparagement 
provision as facially unconstitutional, and permitted Mr. Tam to 
register his trademark.12  The court reaffirmed McGinley’s proposition 
that § 1052(a) does not technically ban any speech.13  However, the 
court held the provision imposes an “unconstitutional condition” 
because it deprives disparaging marks of vitally important business 
protections, thereby discouraging trademark applicants from using 
offensive language.14  The court also ruled that the statutory language 
is viewpoint-discriminatory on its face (and therefore presumptively 
invalid) because the PTO’s exclusion of a mark from the Principal 
Register necessarily depends on its disapproval of the mark’s 
message15—a direct violation of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
mandating content neutrality in government restraints on speech.16 
The Federal Circuit further held that § 1052(a)’s disparagement 
prohibition could not be saved by either the “commercial speech” or 
“government speech” doctrines.17  Regarding the former, the court 
reasoned it is not the mark’s commercial nature as a source identifier, 
but rather its “expressive character” that serves as the basis for an 
unregistrability finding.18  With respect to the latter, the court held that 
a trademark owner’s use of his or her mark is private speech rather than 
government speech.19  The court reasoned that the purpose of 
identifying a business owner’s goods is highly antithetical to any notion 
of government control,20 and that neither the regulatory activity of 
issuing a registration certificate nor the trademark owner’s inclusion 
of an “®” symbol converts this speech from private to government 
status.21 
 
 11  In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacating 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
 12  See generally Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321.  
 13  See id. at 1339–40. 
 14  See id. at 1339–45. 
 15  Id. at 1334–37. 
 16  See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Police Dep’t of Chi. 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 17  See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337–38, 1345. 
 18  Id. at 1337–38. 
 19  Id. at 1345. 
 20  See id. at 1345 (“The fact that COCA COLA and PEPSI may be registered 
trademarks does not mean the government has endorsed these brands of cola, or 
prefers them over other brands.”). 
 21  Id. at 1347. 
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Finally, the court held Congress may not exclude disparaging 
trademarks from the Principal Register on the ground that registration 
constitutes a government subsidy.22  Even though “the scope of the 
subsidy cases has never been extended to a ‘benefit’ like recognition 
of legal rights in speakers against private interference,”23 the court 
seemed to assume arguendo that federal registration constitutes a 
subsidy.  Nevertheless, the court held that Congress does not remain 
“free to distribute the legal rights it creates without respecting First 
Amendment limits on content and viewpoint discrimination.”24   
The Federal Circuit’s recent grant of a rehearing in In re Tam 
demonstrates the questionable status of § 1052(a).  While the Federal 
Circuit seems to have taken a definitive position on the provision’s 
constitutionality, the issue remains heated in other jurisdictions due to 
the PTO’s cancellation of allegedly disparaging trademarks affiliated 
with discriminatory sports team names.25  For this reason, the United 
States Supreme Court granted the federal government’s petition for 
writ of certiorari in September 2016.26  Additionally, the Federal 
Circuit’s en banc opinion expressly limits its holding to § 1052(a)’s 
disparagement prohibition, thereby leaving all constitutional issues 
regarding the statute’s parallel scandalousness prohibition wide open 
for further debate—even within the Federal Circuit’s domain.27 
At first glance, there are two policy implications underlying § 
1052(a)’s statutory language that seem particularly troubling.  First, 
the provision serves as an inviting vehicle through which PTO 
 
 22  Id. at 1353. 
 23  Tam, 808 F.3d at 1351. 
 24  Id. 
 25  See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015); 
see also Eugene Volokh, Federal Appeals Court Decides ‘The Slants’ Case: Excluding 
‘Disparaging Marks’ from Trademark Registration Violates the First Amendment, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2015/12/22/federal-appeals-court-decides-the-slants-case-excluding-disparaging-
marks-from-trademark-registration-violates-the-first-amendment/ (explaining that the 
Tam decision is not binding on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is currently 
considering the continued registrability of the “REDSKINS” mark). 
 26  Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Will Hear ‘Slants’ Trademark Case, Which Is Directly 
Relevant to the Redskins Controversy, WASH. POST. (Sep. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/09/29/supreme-court-will-hear-slants-trademark-case-which-is-
directly-relevant-to-the-redskins-controversy/?utm_term=.71ae766fbbc1. 
 27  Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1; see also Lawrence K. Nodine & Daniel B. Englander, 
In re Tam En Banc Decision—Lanham Act 2(a) Is Unconstitutional, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP 
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015-
12-22-in-re-tam-en-banc-decision-lanham-act-2-a-is-unconstitutional.aspx (“Although 
the Court did not rule that . . . other aspects of the statute were also unconstitutional, 
it nonetheless made clear that it was open to future challenges to these provisions.”). 
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examining attorneys may enforce their own subjective ideas of 
morality—a temptation that exists nowhere else within United States 
intellectual property law.28  In short, the PTO possesses admirable 
expertise in several areas, but it does not possess the ability to assess 
and measure the public’s moral outrage.29  Imposing such an 
unreasonable duty on the PTO compels individual examiners to tap 
into their own political views, religious backgrounds, geographic 
origins, and unique visceral reactions, thereby producing 
irreconcilably inconsistent results.30 
The second troublesome policy implication regarding § 1052(a) 
is that its prohibitions are fundamentally inconsistent with the Lanham 
Act’s underlying purposes: to eliminate “deceptive” and “misleading” 
trademarks from interstate commerce; to protect registrants against 
“unfair competition”; and to prevent commercial “fraud.”31  Other 
sections and subsections of the Lanham Act more appropriately reflect 
these goals.32  However, the prohibition of scandalous and/or 
disparaging trademark registrations is entirely disconnected from 
these concerns.  Offensive marks do not necessarily confuse consumers 
or stimulate unfair competition; they also have the potential to acquire 
 
 28  See Phillips, supra note 9, at 56 (“It seems peculiar to call upon the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office to monitor and protect the morals of society—these sorts 
of police powers have historically been the domain of states and explicitly not the 
domain of the federal government.”).  The free market itself would likely be a more 
appropriate judge of a trademark’s value as a source indicator.  See id.  No equivalent 
morality standard exists in American copyright or patent law; in fact, both of these 
regimes explicitly offer protection for controversial and potentially offensive works.  
See id. at 71.  For example, the United States Copyright Office lacks authority to deny 
copyright registration to a pornographic magazine, provided the magazine constitutes 
an “original work of authorship” fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (2015).  Additionally, the PTO demonstrated its lack of concern for morality as 
a criterion of patentability when it issued a patent for a “female functional” mannequin 
in 1995. Phillips, supra note 9, at 71 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,466,235 (filed Mar. 27, 
1995)).   
 29  Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May 
Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1477 (2011).   
 30  Id. at 1476–77.  
 31  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015).  Subsequent case law has identified additional 
purposes, including: to lessen consumer search costs; to ensure manufacturers reap 
the goodwill of their investments; to identify and distinguish a seller’s goods from 
others; and to enable consumers to make decisions based on previous experiences with 
a particular product. Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 466 (citing Barton Beebe, 
The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (2004)); Robert 
Wright, Today’s Scandal Can Be Tomorrow’s Vogue: Why Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Is 
Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness, 48 HOW. L.J. 659, 660 (2005). 
 32  See, e.g., § 1052(d) (granting the PTO authority to deny registration for marks 
that strongly resemble other previously registered marks and marks that are otherwise 
likely to cause consumer confusion). 
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goodwill and serve as effective source identifiers.33  In sum, the Lanham 
Act’s purposes strongly suggest that registration prohibitions should 
exist only to the extent necessary to reduce consumer confusion.34 
In light of the foregoing policy and the following legal analysis, 
this Comment posits that the Federal Circuit’s resolution of Tam was 
correct, and the United States Supreme Court should affirm the 
decision.  Ultimately, § 1052(a)’s scandalousness and disparagement 
prohibitions should both be struck down as violative of the First 
Amendment.  As opposed to focusing on the viewpoint-discriminatory 
nature of § 1052(a)’s prohibitions, this Comment attacks McGinley 
through an analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as that 
doctrine interacts with Congress’s Article I spending power.  Because 
McGinley failed to even consider the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in its analysis, its ruling that § 1052(a) survives First 
Amendment scrutiny fails to suffice as viable precedent.35  More 
importantly, the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution no 
longer justifies § 1052(a)’s intrusive restrictions on speech.  This latter 
point has little to do with the provision’s content- or viewpoint-
discrimination, and the Federal Circuit need not have engaged in a 
complex First Amendment analysis to dismiss the government’s 
“permissible non-subsidy” argument.  Rather, drastic changes in the 
PTO’s structure36 have rendered McGinley obsolete, and federal 
trademark registration proceedings no longer implicate public 
treasury funds to a constitutionally adequate degree.  In other words, 
even if § 1052(a)’s prohibitions were content-neutral, McGinley’s 
proposition that the Spending Clause grants Congress the power to 
withhold federal trademark registrations is incorrect, because the 
issuance of such a registration does not in any way constitute a 
 
 33  LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1487. 
 34  See Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-”Fame”-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks 
as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 180 (2007) (citing J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th 
ed. 2006)). 
 35  See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 580 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en 
banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).   
 36  See id. (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (citing 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 
(1990); Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,142-01 (Dec. 13, 1991) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 2)) (“[T]he act of registering a trademark does not 
involve the federal treasury.  In 1981, as noted by the McGinley court, trademark 
registration was ‘underwritten by public funds.’  That is no longer true today.  Since 
1991, PTO operations have been funded entirely by registration fees, not the 
taxpayer.”). 
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government subsidy.  
Part II of this Comment summarizes necessary background 
information regarding how § 1052(a) operates in practice.  Part III 
includes a brief description of the constitutional challenges that have 
been raised as prior attempts to invalidate the provision on its face.  
Part IV argues § 1052(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition that 
unlawfully abridges trademark applicants’ First Amendment rights.  
Part V asserts § 1052(a)’s First Amendment intrusion is no longer 
justified by Congress’s Article I spending power.  Finally, Part VI argues 
that as an abridgement of trademark applicants’ First Amendment 
rights to engage in offensive commercial speech, § 1052(a) must 
withstand a form of intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York; the provision 
fails to survive this scrutiny, and it therefore must be invalidated as 
unconstitutional. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF 
SECTION 1052(a) 
A. The Procedural Mechanisms Governing Section 1052(a) Rejections 
and Appeals 
Either a group or an individual may submit an application for 
federal trademark registration to the PTO.37  The application is then 
assigned to an examining attorney who confirms the applicant has 
complied with procedural formalities and determines whether the 
mark overcomes any relevant substantive statutory prohibitions.38  At 
this stage, the examiner can decide the proposed mark consists of 
“scandalous” or “disparaging” material and refuse registration on 
those grounds.39  If this occurs, the denied applicant is given six months 
to amend his or her application, present evidence countering the 
examiner’s finding, or otherwise respond with legal arguments.40  
Following a final office action, a rejected applicant may appeal to the 
TTAB.41  If the applicant is again denied registration, he or she may 
submit an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.42  Via this route, a registration denial can make its way to the 
 
 37  See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2015). 
 38  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 704.01 (5th ed. 2007); Wright, 
supra note 31, at 667 (citing § 1062(b)).  
 39  See § 1052(a). 
 40  See § 1062(b); Wright, supra note 31, at 667–68. 
 41  § 1070. 
 42  See § 1071. 
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United States Supreme Court.43   
By contrast, if the PTO examiner approves the application, the 
PTO publishes notice in The Trademark Official Gazette,44 and the public 
has thirty days to oppose the mark’s registration.45  If no members of 
the public submit an opposition within thirty days, the PTO issues the 
applicant a certificate of registration.46  Once an applicant receives this 
certificate, all protections afforded by the registration are effective.  A 
trademark owner who demonstrates five years of consistent post-
registration commercial use acquires an “incontestable” right to 
continue using the mark in interstate commerce.47  This 
“incontestable” status is somewhat of a misnomer, however, because a 
third party who believes he or she will be damaged by a trademark’s 
scandalous or disparaging qualities may still initiate a TTAB 
cancellation proceeding at any time following the mark’s registration.48 
B. The “Scandalousness” and “Disparagement” Tests 
Although § 1052(a)’s literal language sets forth four separate 
prohibitions against “immoral,” “deceptive,” “scandalous,” and 
“disparaging” subject matter,49 the PTO and courts alike have lumped 
§ 1052(a) challenges into two broadly inclusive categories: those 
asserting scandalousness and those asserting disparagement.   
Courts have defined “scandalous” marks as marks containing 
subject matter that is “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or 
propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the 
conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] calling out [for] 
condemnation.”50  Whether a proposed trademark contains scandalous 
subject matter is to be determined from the perspective of “not 
necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general 
public.”51  Courts make such a determination in the context of 
 
 43  Wright, supra note 31, at 669. 
 44  37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (2006). 
 45  Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and 
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007). 
 46  Id. at 454–55. 
 47  § 1065. 
 48  See Smith, supra note 45, at 455. 
 49  § 1052(a). 
 50  In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re 
Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938)).  Alternatively, the PTO can 
establish scandalousness by showing that a mark is “vulgar.” See In re Boulevard Entm’t, 
Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 51  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).  In Tam, the Federal Circuit 
attached little significance to the PTO’s attempt at objectivity through the “substantial 
composite” standard.  Instead, the court noted that viewpoint discrimination is 
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“contemporary attitudes.”52  Generally speaking, courts have grouped 
“scandalous” trademarks into eight distinct categories: (1) marks 
having religious significance;53 (2) marks containing problematic 
political imagery;54 (3) marks containing sexual innuendo or sexually 
graphic imagery;55 (4) marks containing profanity;56 (5) marks 
implicating illegal substances or activities;57 (6) marks containing slang 
terminology;58 (7) marks containing references to violence;59 and (8) 
marks implicating one’s sexual orientation.60 
 
unlawful regardless of whether the government itself disapproves of the message or 
posits that some other part of the populace will disapprove of the message.  In re Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 
(2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 414 (1989)).   
 52  Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1371 (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 1993)). 
 53  See, e.g., Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327, 329 (barring the mark “MADONNA” 
from registration for wines because members of the Christian faith would likely find 
the association scandalous); see also In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (barring registration of the mark “SENUSSI” for 
cigarettes because the name represents a sect of Muslim culture in which tobacco is 
forbidden for religious reasons). 
 54  See, e.g., Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (Dec. Comm’r 
Pat. 1938) (barring registration of the mark “QUEEN MARY” for women’s 
undergarments); see also Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1216 (overturning a PTO 
examiner’s final refusal to register a condom design featuring traditional American 
stars and stripes). 
 55  See, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485–87 (barring registration of an image depicting 
a nude couple kissing and embracing); see also Ex parte Parfum L’Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 481 (P.T.O. 1952) (overturning a PTO examining attorney’s refusal to register 
the mark “LIBIDO” for perfume scents).  
 56  See, e.g., In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (barring 
registration of the mark “BULLSHIT” for clothing).  But see In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (permitting registration of the mark “BADASS” 
for stringed instruments); see also In re Big Effin Garage, L.L.C., Serial No. 77595225, 
2010 TTAB LEXIS 418 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2010) (permitting registration of the mark 
“BIG EFFIN GARAGE” for online music communities). 
 57  See, e.g., Letter from Edward Fennessy, Trademark Examining Attorney, U.S. 
PTO, to James A. Robb, Trademark Applicant, Serial No. 85,038,867 (Aug. 28, 2010) 
(barring registration of the mark “KO KANE” for alcoholic drinks because a substantial 
composite of the general public would likely interpret the mark as glamorizing drug 
abuse). 
 58  See, e.g., In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (barring 
registration of the mark “BUBBY TRAP” for brassieres). 
 59  See e.g., In re Love Bottling Co., Serial No. 78171270, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 261 
(T.T.A.B. June 22, 2005) (barring registration of the mark “WIFE BEATER” for male 
tank tops); Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,400,213 
(P.T.O. Nov. 18, 2004) (barring registration of the mark “BABY Al QUAEDA” for t-
shirts).  
 60  See, e.g., Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,281,746 
(Feb. 28, 2004, revised Oct. 28, 2004) (barring registration of the mark “DYKES ON 
BIKES” for the San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent), overruled by 
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 By contrast, a “disparaging” mark is one that “dishonors by 
comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or 
affects or injures by unjust comparison.”61  The TTAB articulated the 
seminal two-part test for disparagement in 1999.62  First, the court or 
tribunal must consider dictionary evidence, the relationship of the 
proposed mark’s elements, and the relevant segment of the 
marketplace to determine the mark’s likely meaning.63  Second, the 
court must determine whether a substantial composite of the relevant 
public will perceive that meaning as disparaging.64   
The disparagement test can be distinguished from the 
scandalousness test in three significant ways.  First, “while a trademark 
must be scandalous to be denied, registration can be denied if a 
trademark may be disparaging.”65  In practice, this variation means 
challengers asserting disparagement are required to satisfy a lesser 
burden of proof than challengers asserting scandalousness under 
identical circumstances.  Second, while there are certain situations in 
which a mark may be assessed for scandalousness using only dictionary 
evidence,66 the disparagement test requires a further examination of 
the relevant market segment as well as the allegedly disparaged group’s 
culture.67  Third, rather than depending on the perspective of a 
substantial composite of the general public, disparagement is “evaluated 
from the perspective of a substantial composite of the demographic on 
which the mark is commenting . . . .”68 
In making a § 1052(a) determination of scandalousness or 
disparagement, courts have relied on dictionary definitions, opinion 
surveys, marketing strategies, newspaper articles, Internet forums, 
 
McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212 (T.T.A.B. 
2006).  
 61  In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 62  Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1736 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
 63  Id. at 1738–39. 
 64  Id. at 1736.  
 65  Smith, supra note 45, at 464 (emphasis added).  
 66  See In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding 
that when “multiple dictionaries . . . uniformly indicate that a word is vulgar, and the 
applicant’s use of the word is clearly limited to the vulgar meaning of the word, . . . the 
PTO can sustain its burden of showing that the mark comprises or consists of 
scandalous matter by reference to dictionary definitions alone”), abrogated by In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 67  See Smith, supra note 45, at 464. 
 68  Gibbons, supra note 3, at 212 (emphasis added); see In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (summarizing government’s argument 
that the term, “heeb,” is a “highly disparaging reference to Jewish people, that it retains 
this meaning when used in connection with the applicant’s goods and services, and 
that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it to be disparaging”). 
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blogs, and expert witness testimonies.69  Dictionary definitions are the 
most common form of evidence utilized in § 1052(a) proceedings,70 
and there are some circumstances in which a PTO examining attorney 
can rely solely on dictionary definitions to reject an application.71  
Opinion surveys, by contrast, are expensive and time-consuming; as 
such, courts rarely utilize this form of evidence in scandalousness 
determinations, where it is not required.72 
C. Third-Party Standing to Challenge a Registered Trademark 
The test for standing in trademark cancellation proceedings is 
unusually generous to third parties.73  This is because the TTAB relies 
on third party challenges as a means of enforcing § 1052(a)’s 
prohibitions.74  Acknowledging the “somewhat vague” and “highly 
subjective” qualities of § 1052(a)’s standards,75 the TTAB has stated it 
generally resolves doubts concerning a mark’s registrability in favor of 
the applicant.76  The understanding is that if a significant segment of 
the public later finds the mark to be scandalous or disparaging, then a 
third party can institute an action, and the TTAB will have the 
opportunity to compile a more complete record.77 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court articulated the 
customary requirements for standing under Article III of the 
Constitution: 
Over the years, our cases have established that the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains 
three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) “actual or 
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”  Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . the[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
 
 69  See Lalonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1498–1507. 
 70  See Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d at 1340 (“[D]ictionary definitions represent an 
effort to distill the collective understanding of the community with respect to language 
and thus clearly constitute more than a reflection of the individual views of either the 
examining attorney or the dictionary editors.”). 
 71  See supra note 66. 
 72  Smith, supra note 45, at 461. 
 73  Id. at 456. 
 74  See In re Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1654–55 (T.T.A.B. 1990). 
 75  In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988). 
 76  See, e.g., Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1654. 
 77  Id. at 1654–55. 
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third party not before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” 
as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.”78 
Notwithstanding the usual Article III requirements, a party asserting a 
§ 1052(a) challenge is not required to have a “specific commercial 
interest[] not shared by the general public.”79  Rather, any party who 
believes he or she is (or would be) “damaged” by the trademark at issue 
may file a formal opposition with the PTO prior to the mark’s 
registration or a formal petition for cancellation with the TTAB at any 
time following the mark’s registration.80  A challenger may satisfy this 
lenient standard by (1) showing he possesses a particular characteristic 
directly implicated by the allegedly scandalous or disparaging mark; or 
(2) showing—through surveys, petitions, and/or affidavits from public 
interest groups—that other members of the general public share his 
belief in the potential for widespread emotional or psychological 
harm.81  
As one can imagine, the Act’s generous standing requirement is 
problematic in practice.  This is because the Act “effectively allows 
small special interest groups to curtail others’ speech, raising the risk 
that trademarks are governed by political correctness rather than free 
speech values.”82  As noted above, a third party has the ability not only 
to preclude a trademark owner from achieving federal registration in 
the first instance, but also to institute a cancellation proceeding at any 
time following a successful registration.83  Thus, a trademark owner is 
never free of the risk that his intellectual property rights will be swept 
out from underneath his feet by a third party asserting scandalousness 
or disparagement.  After years of bolstering a product’s reputation and 
investing in goodwill, the possibility remains that an owner will have to 
re-litigate his mark’s moral wholesomeness at the risk of losing his 
registration.84  In this situation, the owner would be forced to create a 
new mark and spend sizeable sums informing the public of the 
 
 78  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citing Whitmore 
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon 
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–43 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41, n.16 (1972)). 
 79  Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 80  15 U.S.C. § 1063–64 (2015). 
 81  LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1508. 
 82  Smith, supra note 45, at 456.  For example, one scholar observes that under the 
standard announced in Ritchie, 170 F.3d 1092, an ultra-conservative Christian group 
may have standing to challenge the validity of federal protections granted to a pro-gay 
rights trademark. Id.   
 83  §§ 1063–64. 
 84  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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association between his new mark and his old product.85  Thus, the 
specter of a looming third party challenger significantly deters the 
adoption of offensive trademarks, and the Lanham Act’s generous 
standing requirements contribute to § 1052(a)’s net chilling effect on 
speech. 
III. PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION 
1052(A) 
A. First Amendment Challenges 
In 1981, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA)86 announced the following: “[I]t is clear that the PTO’s refusal 
to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right to use it.  No 
conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is 
suppressed.  Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would 
not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.”87  During the thirty-
plus years between McGinley and the recent grant of a rehearing en banc 
in In re Tam, the Federal Circuit has continued to reiterate McGinley’s 
reasoning in dismissing First Amendment challenges to § 1052(a).88  
Nonetheless, trademark applicants have continued to challenge the 
statute on First Amendment grounds.  Some scholars contend the 
provision’s constitutional basis is “crumbling.”89  The Federal Circuit’s 
December 2015 ruling90 invalidating § 1052(a)’s disparagement fully 
supports this notion. 
B. Fifth Amendment Void-for-Vagueness Challenges 
The origins of the void-for-vagueness doctrine lie in the Fifth 
 
 85  Id. 
 86  The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the predecessor to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See History of the Federal 
Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special 
_cpa.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).  It was abolished in 1982, one year after McGinley 
was decided.  See id. 
 87  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 88  See, e.g., In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 
334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 89  Phillips, supra note 9, at 66; see Lee, supra note 9, at 67 (quoting Baird, supra 
note 9, at 669) (“An ‘abridgement’ may result from regulations that do not ‘ban,’ 
‘forbid,’ or ‘prohibit.’  In fact, an ‘abridgement’ may result from regulations that 
merely ‘restrict,’ ‘limit,’ ‘impinge,’ or burden.”); Smith, supra note 45, at 468 (“[I]t is 
understood that a speaker cannot be prevented from speaking in a public park just 
because she can go home and say the same speech privately.”).  
 90  Tam, 808 F.3d at 1357–58. 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause.91  In simplest terms, the doctrine 
requires a certain level of specificity in statutory language as a 
prerequisite to the statute’s enforceability.92  A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if: (1) it fails to provide the public with fair 
notice of what conduct is affected by the law; and (2) it has the 
potential to “impermissibly delegate[]” policymaking duties to judicial 
officials, with the “attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.”93  When a vague statute regulates or burdens expression 
in a content-discriminatory manner, the statute raises special concerns 
due to its chilling effect on the freedom of speech.94  The Supreme 
Court has held that a more stringent vagueness test applies under these 
circumstances.95  As such, when a regulation of expression is at issue, 
the Court examines the regulatory language with increased scrutiny to 
ensure that statutory ambiguities do not deter protected speech.96  
Trademark applicants and legal scholars have attacked § 1052(a) as 
unconstitutionally vague on numerous grounds. 
1. Shifting Paradigms 
First, litigants and scholars have argued that society’s idea of what 
is socially acceptable changes over time.  Therefore, that which a 
substantial composite of society considers “scandalous” or 
“disparaging” is at best a moving target.97  While the TTAB has 
acknowledged that it must consider ever-changing attitudes and 
paradigms while ruling on a trademark’s registrability, it has also 
declared, “[T]he fact that profane words may be uttered more freely 
does not render them any the less profane.”98  This reasoning 
essentially enables the TTAB and the PTO to ignore contemporary 
attitudes at their discretion. 
 
2. Blurring of Statutory Definitions 
Second, applicants who are denied trademark registration claim 
that the PTO’s frequent practice of collapsing the scandalousness and 
disparagement analyses into a single amorphous framework lends 
 
 91  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 92  Wright, supra note 31, at 661. 
 93  Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). 
 94  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997). 
 95  Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982). 
 96  F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–18 (2012). 
 97  Phillips, supra note 9, at 70.  
 98  In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
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further ambiguity to statutory terms which are already imprecise.99 
3. Unreliability of Dictionary Evidence 
Next, litigants attack the perceived ineffectiveness of dictionaries 
as evidence to show scandalousness or likely disparagement.  
Applicants assert that the appropriate focus of a § 1052(a) inquiry is 
not necessarily a phrase’s literal meaning, but the way in which a 
substantial composite of the general public or targeted group perceives 
the phrase.100  Simply put, dictionary definitions are ill-suited for this 
task.101  Additionally, dictionary definitions—like social paradigms—
are subject to change over time.102  Many PTO examining attorneys 
have attempted to remedy this deficiency by consulting online 
dictionaries, which may lack sufficient indicia of authoritativeness and 
reliability.103 
4. Lack of Clarity in Substantial Composite Standard 
The Federal Circuit’s “substantial composite” standard also 
possesses a lack of clarity that generates uncertainty among litigants 
and scholars.  The Federal Circuit has acknowledged the “inherent 
difficulty in fashioning a single objective measure like a substantial 
composite of the general public from the myriad of subjective 
viewpoints.”104  To further aggravate the ambiguity, neither case law nor 
legislative history defines a “substantial composite.”105  One 
commentator has posited that the term is a “vacuous point on a 
nebulous continuum . . . chosen post-hoc to justify the decision-
maker’s preconceived determination.”106  To make matters worse, the 
standard has not always been universally articulated or applied.107 
5. Relevance of the Proposed Mark’s Surrounding 
 
 99  See Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 471.  See, e.g., In re Old Glory Condom 
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (“[O]ur finding . . . that the mark 
is not scandalous subsumes a finding that the mark is not disparaging.”). 
 100  Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 469. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 480–81.  See also Gibbons, supra note 3, at 208 (“Some dictionaries are 
slower in recognizing new meanings given to existing words by disenfranchised 
groups.”). 
 103  Gibbons, supra note 3, at 208–09. 
 104  In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 105  See Smith, supra note 45, at 461. 
 106  Gibbons, supra note 3, at 206 n.89. 
 107  See, e.g., In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (applying an 
“average purchaser” standard). 
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Context 
Another inconsistency deals with the relevance of a mark’s 
surrounding context.  As the following case law makes clear, it is 
impossible to be sure of whether the PTO will consider such context 
while making a § 1052(a) determination.  In this regard, two 
contradictory lines of precedent have developed.  First, the McGinley 
line of cases examines a trademark in the context of the underlying 
goods or services it distinguishes.108  A conflicting line of cases 
embodies the per se inquiry, focusing its § 1052(a) inquiries solely on 
the trademark itself, as that mark exists independently from the 
underlying goods or services.109  Examining bodies move back and 
forth between the two approaches—a “schizophrenic movement” that 
leads to greater unpredictability and further administrative 
inconsistency.110 
6. Relevance of Applicant’s Intent 
Trademark applicants have argued that the ambiguous role of 
“intent” also serves as the basis for a vagueness challenge to § 1052(a).  
Simply put, sometimes the TTAB considers the applicant’s intent in 
creating or using a particular mark; other times, the TTAB expressly 
declines to do so.111 
 
 108  See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (barring 
registration of a sexual image partly because the mark indicated that the underlying 
services involved “illicit sexual intercourse”); In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (permitting registration of a condom design 
incorporating elements of the American flag partly because the applicant’s stated 
intent was to raise AIDS awareness by suggesting a national duty to promote HIV 
protection); In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 371 (T.T.A.B. 1978) 
(permitting registration of the mark, “BADASS,” because the mark had an alternative 
non-vulgar meaning, serving as an acronym for “Bettencourt Acoustically Designed 
Audio Sound Systems”). 
 109  Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter 
Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered 
Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 345 (1993).  See, e.g., In re Red Bull G.M.B.H., 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1381 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“It is clearly the profane connotation of the 
term per se, rather than a particular meaning of the term when considered in 
connection with goods . . . .”); In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863 
(T.T.A.B. 1981). 
 110  Abdel-Khalik, supra note 34, at 211. 
 111  Compare In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1077 (T.T.A.B. 2008) 
(“The fact that [an] applicant has good intentions with its use of the term does not 
obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group find[s] the term 
objectionable. . . .  Our focus must be on the perception of the referenced group and 
not [the] applicant’s intentions.”), with Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 
(permitting registration of a condom design featuring American stars and stripes 
largely because the applicant’s intention was not to offend or disparage, but to 
redefine patriotism in a way that prioritizes the fight against AIDS). 
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7. The Non-Role of Precedent in Section 1052(a) 
Determinations 
The doctrine of stare decisis—often somewhat of a cure for 
statutory vagueness concerns—is entirely lacking in the context of § 
1052(a) determinations.  Instead, the PTO and the TTAB are free to 
rule on these issues on a case-by-case basis, without using prior 
decisions as a form of guidance or direction: 
It is well settled that the Board must decide each application 
on its own merits, and decisions regarding other registrations 
do not bind either examining attorneys or this Board.  The 
fact that, whether because of administrative error or 
otherwise, some marks have been registered even though 
they may be in violation of the governing statutory standard 
does not mean that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
must forgo applying that standard in all other cases.112 
Without prior registrations and rejections having some 
precedential force, applicants have no choice but to guess as to 
whether their potentially scandalous or disparaging marks will achieve 
registration.113 
8. Inconsistent Results 
 Finally, trademark applicants and scholars argue that § 1052(a)’s 
vagueness and arbitrariness are best illustrated through the statute’s 
inconsistent (and often humorous) results.  For instance, as of 2011, 
the PTO had received forty-one applications containing the term 
“MILF.”114  Twenty were rejected; twenty were not; the remaining 
application was abandoned.115  “It was a tie.”116  Perhaps Megan M. 
Carpenter and Kathryn T. Murphy best expressed trademark 
applicants’ frustration with these inconsistent results: 
When BULLSHIT for handbags will scandalize the public, 
but BIG PECKER for T-shirts will not; when CLEARLY 
QUEER for clothing will register, but QUEER GEAR, also for 
 
 112  In re RK Netmedia, Inc., No. 77064737, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 389, at *27 (T.T.A.B. 
May 21, 2009) (internal citations omitted). 
 113  LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1506.  For perhaps the most egregious 
example of the arbitrariness that results from the lack of stare decisis in this context, see 
In re Watkins, No. 76138675, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 651 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2005) 
(overturning the PTO’s refusal to register “TWATTY GIRL” following successful 
registrations of “TWATTY” and “TWATTYTRAX” by the same applicant).   
 114  LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1478.  “MILF” is a slang acronym that stands 
for “mother I’d like to fuck.”  Free Speech Coal. v. Holder, 957 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577 
n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
 115  LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1478. 
 116  Id. at 1481. 
RASO  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  1:14 PM 
952 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:935 
clothing, will not; when TWATTY GIRL for cartoon strips is 
rejected, but TWATTY for cartoon strips is not, it is time to 
reexamine the structure and implementation of the section 
2(a) bars.117 
 The foregoing illustrates that § 1052(a) grants tremendously 
unfettered discretion to a small number of PTO attorneys.118  The 
exercise of that discretion is entirely arbitrary, often depending largely 
upon examining attorneys’ unique personal reactions to crude subject 
matter.119  The resulting ambiguity is unfair to trademark applicants, 
who do not have reasonable notice of whether their proposed marks 
will achieve registration.120  More importantly, the uncertainty 
surrounding § 1052(a) provides disincentives that contribute 
significantly to the provision’s chilling effect on speech.  Nevertheless, 
courts and examining bodies have continued to reiterate McGinley’s 
holding that § 1052(a) is “sufficiently precise to enable the PTO and 
the courts to apply the law fairly and to notify a would-be registrant 
that the mark he adopts will not be granted a federal registration.”121 
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction to the Doctrine 
The first reason the Federal Circuit was correct in partially 
overruling McGinley is that McGinley upheld § 1052(a) against First 
Amendment challenge without considering the “unconstitutional 
conditions” doctrine.122  In simplest terms, the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning a 
benefit’s receipt upon the waiver of a constitutional right.123  In other 
words, Congress may not withhold a benefit solely because the 
individual who would otherwise receive it exercised his First 
Amendment right.124  In 1972, Justice Stewart—writing for a majority 
of the Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann—set forth an especially 
clear articulation of the rule: 
 
 117  Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 482. 
 118  See Smith, supra note 45, at 481. 
 119  See Phillips, supra note 9, at 60–61. 
 120  Wright, supra note 31, at 678. 
 121  In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 122  See id. 
 123  See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views) 
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 124  Id. 
RASO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  1:14 PM 
2017] COMMENT 953 
[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are 
some reasons upon which the government may not rely.  It 
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes 
his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his 
interest in freedom of speech.  For if the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally 
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those 
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.125 
In Perry, Plaintiff Robert Sindermann was employed as a professor 
at a state college for ten years.126  Following his election as President of 
the Texas Junior College Teachers’ Association, Mr. Sindermann 
publicly advocated the elevation of the college from two-year to four-
year status—a position the school’s Board of Regents opposed.127  Mr.  
Sindermann alleged that as a result of his choice to voice these 
opinions, the Board of Regents refused to offer him a new employment 
contract for the following academic year.128  The Supreme Court 
remanded the case for further fact-finding, holding that the district’s 
refusal to renew a public contract on these grounds would violate the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.129 
Prior to Perry, the Supreme Court elaborated on its 
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence in Speiser v. Randall.130  In 
Speiser, a group of honorably discharged World War II veterans claimed 
a veterans’ property tax exemption provided by California’s state 
constitution.131  In order to qualify for the exemption, the veterans were 
required to sign an oath stating they did not advocate the overthrow of 
the United States government, and they would not support a foreign 
government in the event of an international conflict.132  In holding that 
the provision violated the veterans’ First Amendment rights, the 
Supreme Court stated the following: 
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax 
exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free 
speech. . . .  To deny an exemption to claimants who engage 
in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for 
 
 125  Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
 126  Id. at 593. 
 127  Id. at 594–95. 
 128  Id. at 595. 
 129  Id. at 598. 
 130  Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 131  Id. at 514–15. 
 132  Id. at 515. 
RASO  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  1:14 PM 
954 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:935 
such speech.  Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State 
were to fine them for this speech. . . .  Congress may not by 
withdrawal of privileges place limitations upon the freedom 
of speech which if directly attempted would be 
unconstitutional.133 
In short, the Court held that the California state government’s 
withholding of a tax exemption took on coercive characteristics, 
thereby indirectly suppressing “dangerous ideas” by threatening to 
penalize claimants for engaging in proscribed speech.134  The 
excerpted passage from the Court’s holding emphasizes a key rationale 
underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—that the 
government may not circumvent an individual’s constitutional rights 
by achieving indirectly what it is forbidden from achieving in a more 
forthright manner. 
B. Section 1052(a) Imposes an Unconstitutional Condition 
In Perry, a school district improperly conditioned a public 
contract’s renewal upon a teacher’s waiver of his right to advocate a 
political position.135  In Speiser, a state government similarly 
conditioned a tax exemption upon a veteran’s waiver of his right to 
advocate the overthrow of the federal government.136  By way of 
analogy, § 1052(a) conditions the benefits of federal trademark 
registration upon an applicant’s surrender of his First Amendment 
right to engage in offensive speech.137  
As a preliminary matter, the benefits of federal trademark 
registration are numerous, and they provide trademark owners with 
indispensable advantages in litigation.  First, upon registration, the 
PTO publishes constructive notice of trademark ownership in The 
Trademark Official Gazette, as well as in several other internationally 
distributed materials.138  Next, § 1057 of the Lanham Act provides that 
a registration certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of trademark 
ownership and validity.139  This same provision provides federal 
 
 133  Id. at 518. 
 134  See id. at 519 (quoting American Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 
402 (1950)). 
 135  See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text. 
 136  See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.  
 137  Phillips, supra note 9, at 67–68. 
 138  See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2015); Kristin D. Stout, Terrifying Trademarks and a 
Scandalous Disregard for the First Amendment: Section 2(a)’s Unconstitutional Prohibition on 
Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Trademarks, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213, 218 
(2015). 
 139  15 U.S.C. § 1057 (2010). 
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trademark registrants with a nationwide right of priority in 
cancellation proceedings, as well as an exclusive right to commercial 
use of the registered mark in connection with the specified goods or 
services.140  Moreover, a separate provision of the Lanham Act provides 
that a registrant’s right to use his or her mark in commerce becomes 
incontestable after five consecutive years of post-registration use.141  
Finally, federal registrants may enlist the aid of United States Customs 
to bar the importation of infringing goods,142 and they may sue in 
federal courts to enforce their trademark rights upon a discovery of 
infringing activities.143 
While § 1052(a) does not explicitly prohibit offensive speech from 
entering the marketplace, its removal of the foregoing benefits evinces 
a congressional intent to discourage such speech, thereby creating a 
chilling effect that threatens to deprive trademark applicants of 
essential business protections.144  In other words, McGinley correctly 
asserts that a § 1052(a) denial would not prevent Mr. Tam from 
continuing to refer to his musical act as “The Slants” in commerce; 
however, such a denial severely burdens this use by withholding rights 
that are essential in the entertainment industry, thereby placing Mr. 
Tam and his fellow band members at a competitive disadvantage.145  
Pursuant to Perry and Speiser, it is irrelevant that Mr. Tam has no 
constitutional right to federal trademark registration, and it is equally 
irrelevant that the lack of registration does not prevent him from using 
the speech at issue.  As discussed supra,146 these cases instruct that the 
purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to prevent the 
federal government from achieving indirectly what it is prohibited 
from accomplishing directly.147  Because the First Amendment 
 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. § 1065. 
 142  See id. § 1124. 
 143  See id. § 1121. 
 144  Phillips, supra note 9, at 67–68. 
 145  See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en 
banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Baird, supra note 9, at 677 (“Although it is clear that 
barring and removing offensive matter from the federal registers will not proscribe the 
commercial use of such matter, it certainly provides an economic disincentive to 
engage in such use.”); Stout, supra note 138, at 216 (“To have an unprotected mark, 
one that any other entity is free to exercise as part of its commercial or noncommercial 
presence, can mean a total lack of identity. . . .  [T]o be denied federal registration . . . 
is not so insignificant . . . as the Federal Circuit would have us believe.”). 
 146  See supra notes 122–134 and accompanying text. 
 147  See Lee, supra note 9, at 68 (quoting Baird, supra note 9, at 693). 
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prohibits the government from directly banning offensive speech,148 it 
is impermissible for Congress to achieve an identical result by 
prohibiting registration of “The Slants” under § 1052(a).149 
One could argue that the government’s actions in Perry and Speiser 
are distinguishable from § 1052(a) because the restrictions at issue 
were absolute bars on the plaintiffs’ expressive activities.  By contrast, § 
1052(a) refusals extend only as far as the government’s corresponding 
grant of exclusivity in a particular mark.  In other words, the § 1052(a) 
prohibitions are connected to the government’s grant of a monopoly 
in a way that the restrictions at issue in Perry and Speiser were not related 
to the renewal of an employment contract and the grant of a tax 
exemption, respectively.  This argument implicates the distinction 
between a permissible non-subsidy and an impermissible penalty.  
 The argument proceeds as follows:  Through § 1052(a), Congress 
and the PTO are effectively saying, “We will give you a benefit, but you 
can’t use that benefit to speak in a scandalous or disparaging manner.”  
In Perry and Speiser, by contrast, the government is saying, “We will 
grant you a benefit, provided that you refrain from engaging in certain 
speech altogether.”  A simplified example best illustrates the difference.  
If the government were to hand an individual one hundred dollars, yet 
prohibit the individual from using that one hundred dollars to engage in 
political advocacy, this act would constitute a permissible non-
subsidy.150  However, if the government were to offer the same 
individual one hundred dollars, while conditioning its receipt on the 
individual’s agreement to refrain from political speech entirely, this 
would constitute an unlawful, improperly coercive government 
action.151  The former situation represents a permissible use of the 
government’s spending powers, but the latter scenario imposes an 
unconstitutional condition.152  Some would argue that § 1052(a) is 
more closely analogous to the former situation, while Perry and Speiser 
are representative of the latter.   
The foregoing effort to distinguish § 1052(a) from Perry and 
Speiser is without merit.  A proper analysis must assess: (1) the 
 
 148  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
561 (1980) (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
761–62 (1976)) (“The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted 
governmental regulation.”). 
 149  See Lee, supra note 9, at 68. 
 150  Telephone Conference with Thomas Healy, Professor of Law, Seton Hall Univ. 
Sch. of Law (Dec. 22, 2015). 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
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enormous competitive disadvantages a trademark applicant faces 
when his federal registration is rejected; and (2) the economic 
senselessness of foregoing the benefits that coincide with registration.  
When considered in light of these practical realities, countless 
prospective trademark registrants have in fact been entirely precluded 
not only from registering offensive trademarks, but also from adopting 
them in the first place. Together, these factors illustrate the broad 
“chilling effect” that § 1052(a) has on scandalous and disparaging 
speech. 
Keeping the foregoing economic realities in mind, § 1052(a) 
functions practically as an absolute bar against offensive speech.  No 
sensible businessman would invest time, money, and other resources 
in developing a mark if he knew beforehand that he would be unable 
to assert nationwide priority in that mark.  Nor would he sacrifice the 
ability to rely on advantageous presumptions in litigation.  The owner 
would simply select a different mark.  To act otherwise would be to 
forfeit rights in all geographic areas in which he is not actually using 
the mark, and to allow competitors to usurp his goodwill.  In short, 
such a sacrifice would be economic suicide.  The only realistic response 
to § 1052(a), therefore, is for trademark owners to discontinue the use 
of offensive marks prior to any substantial investment in goodwill.153  
Importantly, this discouragement extends beyond the federal 
government’s grant of a monopoly, and it permeates the commercial 
marketplace.  Not only is this eradication of offensive speech the 
practical effect of § 1052(a), but it is also the only conceivable 
congressional intent underlying the provision. 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily appropriate to characterize the 
restrictions at issue in Perry and Speiser as absolute bars.  Nothing in the 
school district’s refusal to renew an employment contract precluded 
the plaintiff in Perry from continuing to advocate his political views 
while seeking employment in another jurisdiction.  Similarly, nothing 
prohibited the plaintiffs in Speiser from continuing to advocate the 
overthrow of the federal government while seeking to qualify for a 
different tax exemption.  In a sense, the availability of alternatives in 
 
 153  The Supreme Court has held that similar “do-or-die” scenarios are 
impermissible.  See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70–71 (1936) (“The regulation 
is not . . . voluntary.  The farmer . . . may refuse to comply, but the price . . . is the loss 
of benefits.  The amount offered is . . . sufficient to exert pressure . . . to agree to the 
proposed regulation.  The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power 
to coerce or destroy.”); see also Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593 
(1926) (“In reality, the carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock 
and the whirlpool—an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood 
or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden.”). 
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Perry and Speiser makes the government actions in those cases less 
susceptible to challenge under the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.  By contrast, a trademark applicant facing a § 1052(a) 
rejection has no available alternatives.  The certificate of federal 
registration is a unique right offered solely by the PTO, and the 
deprivation of its benefits forces sensible businessmen to completely 
forego using their marks in commerce. 
V. SECTION 1052(A)’S FIRST AMENDMENT INTRUSION IS NO 
LONGER JUSTIFIED BY CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER. 
A. Congress’s Spending Power 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (“the Spending Clause”) grants 
Congress broad discretion to tax the public and spend public funds to 
promote the general welfare.154  This means that when the federal 
government appropriates funds from the public treasury to initiate a 
program, the Spending Clause grants Congress the authority to 
establish and define the limits of that program.155  In other words, 
Congress may insist that funds from the federal treasury are spent in 
the congressionally authorized manner and for congressionally 
authorized purposes.156  This power occasionally includes the authority 
to impose conditions that affect recipients’ constitutional rights.157  
Thus, there exists an inherent tension between applying the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and protecting Congress’s ability 
to direct government spending.158  
Pursuant to its Spending Clause authority, Congress may 
condition the receipt of federal funds upon the satisfaction of 
objectives that are not included within its enumerated powers.159  
Congress may also be selective with regard to what it considers to 
promote the “general welfare”; for example, Congress may selectively 
fund certain activities if it feels those activities are in the public’s best 
 
 154  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 155  United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 196 (2003) (citing Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
 156  In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Am. Library Ass’n, 539 
U.S. at 211–12), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. 
granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).   
 157  Id. (quoting Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2321, 2328 (2013)). 
 158  See id. at 577. 
 159  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 66 (1936). 
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interest, but may decline to subsidize other programs that propose 
alternative solutions to the same problem.160  In doing so, Congress 
does not necessarily engage in unlawful viewpoint discrimination; 
rather, it simply chooses to “fund one activity to the exclusion of 
another.”161  Typically, if a recipient objects to a condition placed upon 
the receipt of federal funds, the sole remedy is to decline the funds 
and seek financial support elsewhere.162  This remains the case even 
when a recipient’s objection is that the condition violates his 
constitutional rights to free speech.163 
B. Limitations on Congress’s Spending Power 
While Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause is very 
broad, there are some checks, balances, and limitations on that power.  
For instance, Congress is required to exercise its spending authority 
only in pursuit of the general welfare.164  Additionally, Congress may 
not impose conditions in an attempt to regulate speech that is 
unrelated to the program at issue.165  Congress is also prohibited from 
encouraging others to violate the Constitution.166  None of these 
limitations appear problematic with regard to § 1052(a).  But two 
further restrictions on Congress’s spending power are relevant in 
assessing § 1052(a)’s constitutionality: (1) the requirement that 
Congress exercise its spending powers only with respect to funds that 
belong to the public treasury;167 and (2) the requirement that Congress 
refrain from “coercing” recipients to behave in a certain way.168 
C. Trademark Application Fees Are Private Expenditures Unconnected to 
 
 160  Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 161  Id. 
 162  All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. 
 163  Id. 
 164  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); Butler, 297 U.S. at 66).  In Dole, the Supreme Court 
articulated several factors courts should consider in deciding whether Congress has 
exceeded its authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1.  Although the Court has 
never expressly held that the “Dole factors” apply when Congress provides financial 
incentives to individuals, the Court has implicitly considered similar factors under 
these circumstances.  See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 
 165  In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views) 
(quoting All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2328), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 
F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as 
corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).   
 166  Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
 167  See, e.g., Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 
760 F.3d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 168  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
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the Public Treasury. 
First, there is the most blatant and egregious way in which § 
1052(a) exceeds Congress’s spending authority.  Due to drastic 
changes in the PTO’s structure since McGinley was decided, federal 
trademark registration proceedings no longer implicate public 
treasury funds.  At the time McGinley was decided, trademark 
registrations were funded primarily by federal tax dollars,169 and the 
case was necessarily decided against this background.  As such, 
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause at least arguably 
justified the resulting intrusions upon applicants’ First Amendment 
rights.170  Since Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1991, however, trademark registrations have been funded 
entirely through user fees paid by the applicants themselves.171  As one 
judge has stated, “Unlike tangible property, a subsidy, or a tax 
exemption, bestowal of trademark registration does not result in a 
direct loss to any property or money from the public fisc.”172  Therefore, 
the Spending Clause justification no longer has merit.  The 
significance of this change is best illustrated through two federal cases 
that elaborate on the “public treasury” limitation: Rust v. Sullivan173 and 
Department of Texas, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States v. Texas 
Lottery Commission.174  
 In Rust v. Sullivan, the Department of Human Services 
promulgated regulations prohibiting Title X fund recipients from 
engaging in abortion-related activities, including counseling and 
referral services.175  Recipient healthcare providers challenged the 
constitutionality of the regulations, alleging Title X conditioned the 
receipt of federal funds upon the relinquishment of First Amendment 
rights—a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.176  The 
United States Supreme Court held that the regulations did not abridge 
the recipients’ First Amendment rights.177  Rather, this was a 
permissible non-subsidy—a perfect example of Congress choosing to 
“fund one activity to the exclusion of another,” while simultaneously 
ensuring that the funds it provided were not used for purposes outside 
 
 169  See Tam, 785 F.3d at 580.  
 170  See id. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 174  Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Texas Lottery Comm’n, 760 
F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 175  Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–81. 
 176  See id. at 181. 
 177  See id. at 192–200. 
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the federal program’s scope.178  An important factor in the Court’s 
decision was that Title X subsidies were moneys obtained directly from 
the public fisc.179 
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reached the opposite result in Texas Lottery Commission.  In that 
case, the Texas state government promulgated the regulation at issue.  
However, the Fifth Circuit found that the Texas state government’s 
spending power was sufficiently analogous to that of the federal 
government’s to warrant judicial review under an Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 1 framework.180  The case dealt with a 1980 amendment to the 
Texas state constitution, which exempted qualified charitable 
organizations from state gambling prohibitions, provided the 
organizations refrained from using net gambling proceeds to engage 
in political advocacy.181  A group of affected charities sued the state’s 
lottery commission, alleging an abridgement of their First Amendment 
rights.182  The Fifth Circuit ruled that the regulatory regime granted a 
license, which is separate and distinct from a government subsidy.183  
The charities received no funds from the public fisc, and the 
restrictions on speech therefore were subject to unrestricted analysis 
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.184  The court 
distinguished the licenses from tax exemptions, which constitute a 
form of government subsidy administered.185  Here, however, no public 
monies were involved, and the only government “grant” was the grant 
of authority to conduct an activity that would otherwise be illegal186—
essentially a form of protection against criminal prosecution or civil 
lawsuit. 
Section 1052(a) is analogous to the provisions of the Texas state 
constitution at issue in Texas Lottery Commission, because a trademark 
registration certificate costs the federal government nothing.187  As a 
 
 178  Id. at 174–75. 
 179  See id. at 198. 
 180  See Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 760 
F.3d 427, 434 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 181  Id. at 431 (citing Bingo Enabling Act, TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2001.001–.657 
(West 2014)). 
 182  Id. 
 183  See id. at 437. 
 184  Id. 
 185  See id. at 436–37. 
 186  Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 760 F.3d at 436. 
 187  See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 580 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views) 
(“Like the programs in Bullfrog and Texas Lottery Commission, the system of trademark 
registration is a regulatory regime, not a government subsidy program.”), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 
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form of protection from trademark infringement and unfair 
competition, the certificate functions as an occupational license, 
rather than a government subsidy.  The lack of federal funds also 
distinguishes a § 1052(a) denial from the Title X regulations at issue 
in Rust v. Sullivan, which simply specified how federal funds were to be 
used if and when granted to a recipient program.188  Here, the federal 
government grants no such funds to a trademark applicant, so similar 
specifications are unwarranted.  In fact, numerous judges and 
commentators have observed that more government resources are 
expended following § 1052(a) rejections than could ever be spent on 
their approvals.189 
 Although trademark registrations are fully funded by privatized 
applicant fees, it remains the case that the government inevitably 
spends some public funds on facilitating the examining process and 
otherwise allowing a litigant to enforce his rights.190  Examples of these 
expenditures include public employee salaries, pensions, health 
insurance, other benefits, and court costs.191  However, this routine dip 
into the public treasury is too attenuated from Lanham Act benefits to 
justify § 1052(a)’s First Amendment intrusion under Congress’s 
spending powers.192  A holding otherwise would implicate the 
Spending Clause with regard to every benefit the government 
provides, thereby transforming the coercive denial of those benefits 
into permissible non-subsidies. 
For instance, if the government’s act of registering a trademark 
qualified as a subsidy, then one could argue the government subsidizes 
the author of a book when it grants him or her a copyright.193  The 
government could then circumvent the First Amendment’s 
prohibitions and ban the registration of literary works tending to 
offend scattered segments of the public.  If Congress had decided to 
deny the benefits and incentives of copyright registration to literary 
works that contain scandalous and/or disparaging material, it may 
 
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 
(2016). 
 188  See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text. 
 189  See, e.g., Tam, 785 F.3d at 583 (Moore, J., additional views); In re McGinley, 660 
F.2d 481, 487 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., dissenting) (“More ‘public funds’ are being 
expended in the prosecution of this appeal than would ever result from the 
registration of the mark.”); Phillips, supra note 9, at 68–69 (“It seems likely that more 
governmental time and resources are needlessly spent with office actions and appellate 
work targeted at barring scandalous marks than is saved by their proscription.”).  
 190  See Tam, 785 F.3d at 580. 
 191  Id.  See also Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 192  Tam, 785 F.3d at 580–81. 
 193  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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have deprived the world of such great works as Mark Twain’s The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, J.D. Salinger’s A Catcher in the Rye, and D. 
H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterly’s Lover.  Pursuant to the government’s 
position in Tam, Congress could also use its spending power to 
regulate the content displayed during parades.  After all, most parades 
take place on public property and require licenses or permits.  The 
offices that issue these licenses or permits are run by public employees, 
and public tax dollars fund those employees’ salaries and benefits. 
Obviously, the government’s argument becomes absurd when 
taken to these extremes.  That is because the costs the government 
incurs in registering trademarks are the same incidental costs that 
accompany any system of governmental registration, e.g., copyrights, 
patents, property deeds, etc.194  In deciding whether a tension exists 
between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and Congress’s 
spending power, courts only consider whether the conditioned benefits 
are paid for with public treasury funds, not whether the programs are 
subsidized in more routine, indirect manners.195 
An opposing argument exists in the notion that PTO user fees 
become public treasury funds once the government possesses them.  But 
this argument fails to recognize the distinction between a public “tax” 
and a private “fee.”  The policy underlying a taxation system is that 
citizens who benefit from a government’s existence should pay their 
fair shares to maintain that government.196  Importantly, there is little 
to no connection between an individual taxpayer and the entity that 
decides how to spend the collected revenue.197  A tax provides the 
treasury with public funds that it may allocate to any lawful 
governmental purpose, and there is no guarantee that those funds will 
directly benefit the taxpayer.198  By contrast, a government entity 
collects a “commodity charge” or a “user fee” in exchange for a specific 
product or service it renders to the paying consumer.199  In this latter 
situation, protections ensure that the fee’s proceeds are used 
exclusively to finance the goods or services in the transaction at hand, 
and the sums are not used for general government purposes.200 
Although funds do not have to satisfy the technical definition of a 
 
 194  Id. at 1356. 
 195  Id. at 1353–54.  
 196  See Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 
337 (2003). 
 197  Gruen v. Tax Comm’n, 211 P.2d 651, 651–70 (Wash. 1949), overruled in part by 
State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963). 
 198  See Spitzer, supra note 196, at 338–39. 
 199  Id. at 343.  
 200  Id.  
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tax to constitute “funds within the public treasury’s possession,” the 
foregoing distinction is helpful in determining whether the federal 
government possesses the funds at issue.  While labels are not always 
dispositive, it seems that in the context of federal trademarks, 
registration fees are just what they purport to be: private fees.  First, 
the payments are not compulsory.  Second, a direct relationship exists 
between the payment made and the service received in exchange for 
that payment: a PTO registration certificate.  Most importantly, 
trademark applicants do not pay these fees so the federal government 
may spend them on various programs at its discretion.  Instead, these 
fees cover the costs of operating the PTO.201  In fact, patent and 
trademark registration fees together cover the entirety of that cost.202 
 There is a small catch.  The amounts collected from patent and 
trademark registration fees actually constitute about 110% of the cost 
of running the PTO.203  Through the federal government’s 
controversial “surcharge” mechanism, the remaining surplus used to 
be “siphoned off” to finance other government programs.204  This 
suggests the government exercises at least some ownership and control 
over patent and trademark registration fees.  But in 1998, the 
surcharge experiment expired.205  Now, theoretically, the remaining 
“extra” funds are made available to the PTO in the following fiscal year 
on a rollover basis.206  While the diversion of these remaining funds to 
other federal programs has continued despite the expiration of 
Congress’s surcharge mechanism, such diversion is widely perceived as 
fundamentally unfair to patent and trademark holders.207  For this 
reason, Congress has initiated movements to prevent further incidents 
of this diversion.208 
 
 201  Report to the House of Delegates, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2, 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/106legis/ptouserfee.
doc. 
 202  Id. 
 203  See id. at 2. 
 204  Id. 
 205  See id. at 3. 
 206  See id. at 4. 
 207  See Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 201, at 2 (“This practice of diversion 
of USPTO user fees to fund unrelated government activities is unfair to those who pay 
the fees and is damaging to our nation’s economic health and progress.  It must be 
stopped.”); USPTO Funding, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.ipo.org/index 
.php/advocacy/hot-topics/uspto-funding/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (“IPO has long 
advocated adequate funding for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and 
seeks to ensure that the USPTO has access to all user fees collected each year.  A fully 
funded USPTO is a key to innovation and job creation and to strengthening the U.S. 
economy.”). 
 208  See, e.g., Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 1832, 114th Cong. (2015); Patent Fee 
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D. Section 1052(a) Functions as a Coercive Penalty. 
Even assuming arguendo that the federal trademark registration 
system implicates public funds, the statute must be invalidated as 
unduly coercive.  When Congress conditions the receipt of federal 
benefits, it may not do so to the extent that the condition operates as 
a compulsion.209  In this regard, a fine line distinguishes a permissible 
non-subsidy from a coercive penalty.  Two seminal Supreme Court 
cases demonstrate this distinction: South Dakota v. Dole,210 and United 
States v. Butler.211   
 In Dole, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a federal law 
that withheld five percent of federal highway funds from states that 
permitted persons less than twenty-one years of age to purchase 
alcohol.212  The Court did not find that the threatened withholding of 
funds was sufficiently coercive to amount to a compulsion, thereby 
exceeding the bounds of Congress’ Spending Clause authority.213  
Instead, the Court found that the law functioned merely as a financial 
inducement; while each state had an incentive to comply with 
Congress’ requested minimum drinking age, it also retained a realistic 
choice as to whether such compliance was worthwhile.214  Of course, 
the states remained free to seek highway revenue from other sources.   
 In United States v. Butler, by contrast, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act as an abuse of Congress’ 
spending power, partly because the Act attempted to use economic 
pressure as a form of coercion.215  The legislation imposed a 
“processing tax” on agricultural commodity producers and 
redistributed the tax’s proceeds to producers who agreed to reduce 
 
Integrity Act, S. 2146, 113th Cong. (2014); Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 3349, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Patents and Trademarks Encourage New Technology Jobs Act, H.R. 
2582, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. REP. NO. 106-1048 (2001). 
 209  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 210  Dole, 483 U.S. 203. 
 211  Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 
 212  See Dole, 483 U.S. 203. 
 213  See id. at 211 (“When we consider . . . that all South Dakota would lose if she 
adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds 
otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to 
coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.”). 
 214  See id. at 211–12 (“Here Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to 
the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose. 
But the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the States not merely in 
theory but in fact.”). 
 215  See Butler, 297 U.S. 1.   
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their net acreage.216  Unlike the South Dakota state government in Dole, 
the Supreme Court held that the individual farmers in Butler retained 
no realistic choice other than to accept the funds and reduce their 
output of crops.217  The amount of funds offered created sufficient 
pressure to amount to an compulsion, thus depriving the farmers of 
any viable alternatives.  The Court held that the “choice” at issue 
positioned each crop producer “between the rock and the whirlpool,” 
granting him “an ‘option’ to forego a privilege which may be vital to 
his livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an 
intolerable burden.”218 
Section 1052(a)’s prohibitions function as coercive penalties.  Dole 
and Butler illustrate that the primary factor distinguishing a non-
subsidy from a penalty is whether the affected parties retain a realistic 
choice to decline the benefit in question and seek its equivalent 
elsewhere.219  Simply put, rejected trademark applicants have no such 
choice.  All funds—to a certain extent—are fungible; in this regard, 
money is distinguishable from a certificate of federal trademark 
registration.  The latter is a unique bundle of rights offered solely by 
the PTO.  A rejected applicant has nowhere else to turn if his mark 
fails to conform to § 1052(a)’s arbitrary standards.  Thus, the 
traditional remedy of declining a benefit and seeking its equivalent 
elsewhere is unavailable. 
VI. CENTRAL HUDSON: WHY DOES IT ALL MATTER? 
Because § 1052(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition that is 
unjustifiable as a non-subsidy, the provision must withstand 
constitutional scrutiny in order to pass muster.220  The initial matter to 
be decided is what level of scrutiny applies. 
As discussed supra,221 Mr. Tam’s trademark goes beyond merely 
identifying his musical act.  Rather, his stated intent is to “reclaim” and 
“take ownership” of traditionally offensive Asian stereotypes, thereby 
conveying that Asian Americans should stand strong and be proud of 
their cultural heritage.222  Mr. Tam’s trademark and accompanying 
 
 216  Id. at 53–57. 
 217  Id. at 70–71. 
 218  Id. at 72 (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 
(1926)).  
 219  See supra notes 212–218 and accompanying text. 
 220  See Davis, supra note 109, at 368 (“A finding that Section 2(a) properly should 
be held to satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment is not, of course, dispositive 
of the separate and independent issue of whether it does satisfy those standards.”). 
 221  See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 222  In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g 
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message implicate racial, societal, and political issues—all of which 
comprise the “heartland” of speech entitled to First Amendment 
protection.223 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s disposition of Tam demonstrates 
that § 1052(a) contains viewpoint-based restrictions of speech subject 
to strict scrutiny.224  Pursuant to § 1052(a), it is permissible for a 
trademark applicant to register marks that refer to a particular group 
or idea in a positive way, but it is impermissible for the same applicant 
to register a mark that refers to the same group or idea in a harmful, 
scandalous, or disparaging way.225  A listener’s probable reaction to 
expression is not a content-neutral basis for regulation;226 rather, this 
criterion depends entirely on the content of the speaker’s message.  
The government does not dispute that § 1052(a)’s purpose is to deter 
the vilest messages from ever entering commerce.227  This objective 
solidifies § 1052(a) as a classic example of a restraint that targets 
expressive content, thereby threatening to eliminate disfavored views 
from the marketplace of ideas.  However, because § 1052(a) fails to 
survive even the intermediate scrutiny applied to commercial speech 
restrictions, an argument for strict scrutiny becomes largely irrelevant. 
 As one of the single most important commercial assets a manufacturer 
or seller can own, a trademark undoubtedly falls within the definition 
of commercial speech.228  In Central Hudson, the United States Supreme 
Court defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”229  Similarly, in 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the 
Court described commercial speech as involving the “dissemination of 
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what 
 
en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. 
Ct. 30 (2016).  
 223  Id. 
 224  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227, 2230 (2015) (holding content-based speech restrictions are 
subject to strict scrutiny, and government discrimination among viewpoints is a 
particularly egregious form of content discrimination); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining strict scrutiny is necessary when a regulation burdens 
speech based on the government’s disapproval of the speakers message). 
 225  See Tam, 785 F.3d at 582. 
 226  See Forsyth City v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992). 
 227  See Appellee’s En Banc Brief at 1–3, Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (No. 14-1203). 
 228  Lee, supra note 9, at 71.  
 229  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
561 (1980) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).  
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reason, and at what price.”230  The Court has at least once identified 
trademarks as commercial speech.231  After all, trademarks serve as 
commercial identifiers—symbols, words, pictures, and/or logos used 
to distinguish a company’s goods from those manufactured by 
others.232 
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part 
framework to determine the constitutionality of commercial speech 
restrictions.  First, in order to come within the ambit of First 
Amendment protection, the speech at issue must concern lawful 
activity.233  Second, the speech must not be misleading.234  Third, courts 
must determine whether the government interest underlying the 
restriction qualifies as “substantial.”235  Finally, the regulation must 
“directly advance” the asserted interest in a manner that is not “more 
extensive than necessary.”236  As shown below, § 1052(a) fails to 
withstand intermediate scrutiny because the government is unable to 
assert a substantial interest in restricting scandalous or disparaging 
commercial speech.237  Therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the third 
and fourth steps of the Central Hudson framework. 
 Although the Lanham Act’s legislative history provides no indication 
of Congress’s intent in enacting § 1052(a), courts and scholars have 
manufactured three plausible purposes: (1) a desire to protect the 
public from offensive trademarks; (2) a desire to refrain from 
“stamping the government’s imprimatur” on an offensive mark; and 
(3) a congressional choice not to subsidize offensive material with 
federal funds.238  
 Supreme Court precedent forecloses use of the first proposed 
interest—protection of the public welfare.239  It is a fundamental 
 
 230  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
 231  See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
 232  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015). 
 233  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 234  Id.  
 235  Id. 
 236  Id. 
 237  To date, no court has considered Central Hudson in the context of a § 1052(a) 
appeal.  Whether or not a “substantial government interest” for the provision exists is 
at best ambiguous.  See Stout, supra note 138, at 241 (positing that when viewed 
collectively, the possible governmental interests in support of § 1052(a) are too weak 
to justify the provision’s abridgement of protected commercial speech). 
 238  See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 582–85 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional 
views), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on 
reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub 
nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); Phillips, supra note 9, at 68–69.  
 239  See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571–72 (2011). 
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precept of First Amendment jurisprudence that the government may 
not suppress or burden speech merely because it is offensive to some 
viewers or listeners.240  Additionally, the government continues to argue 
that the refusal to register a trademark does not remove the mark from 
commerce or otherwise limit its access to the public.241  It is hypocritical 
for the government to argue that a § 1052(a) denial will not prevent 
an applicant from using his speech in commerce, while also arguing 
that such a denial will protect the public from offensive material. 
The second proposed interest—the concern that trademark 
registration signifies the government’s “stamp of approval” on an 
offensive mark—has been largely discounted by relevant case law.  For 
instance, in In re Old Glory Condom Corp., the TTAB stated the following: 
The duty of this Office under the Trademark Act in reviewing 
applications for registration is nothing more and nothing 
less than to register those marks that are functioning to 
identify and distinguish goods and services in the 
marketplace . . . .  Just as the issuance of a trademark 
registration by this Office does not amount to a government 
endorsement of the quality of the goods to which the mark 
is applied, the act of registration is not a government 
imprimatur or pronouncement that the mark is a ‘good’ one 
in an aesthetic, or any analogous, sense.242 
In a manner consistent with Old Glory Condom, scholars agree that 
trademark registration should not signify political support for the 
underlying mark any more than patent registration signifies an 
endorsement of the underlying invention.243 
The third proposed government interest in support of § 
1052(a)—a congressional choice not to use public funds to subsidize 
offensive speech—no longer carries any weight.  In 1981, the CCPA 
stated that “the prohibition against registering scandalous marks was 
not ‘an attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the 
Congress that such marks not occupy the time, services, and use of 
funds of the federal government.’”244  The court provided a multitude 
of ways in which the federal government spent funds while registering 
a trademark.245  However, this justification for the abridgement of 
 
 240  See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 60 (1983). 
 241  See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), abrogated in part by In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 242  In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993). 
 243  See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 9, at 69. 
 244  LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1482 (quoting McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486). 
 245  This list included the following: maintaining public records; publishing notice 
in an official publication; enlisting U.S. Customs to block the importation of infringing 
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speech no longer stands on firm ground.  Federal trademark 
registration is now funded almost entirely by user fees, and therefore 
costs the government very little money.246  In fact, multiple courts have 
stated that in light of the § 1052(a) appeal process, it frequently costs 
the government more money to refuse registration than it does to 
allow it.247 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 It is easy to garner sympathy for those personally offended by 
scandalous or disparaging trademarks, but the Lanham Act is not a 
proper vehicle through which these persons can constitutionally 
alleviate their frustrations.  Scholars have suggested that perhaps a 
more appropriate remedy lies within the operation of a free, 
unrestrained marketplace.248  In any event, the First Amendment 
protects not only harmless expression, but hurtful expression too.249  If 
the rationales underlying freedom of speech are to have any true 
meaning, the American people must tolerate some insulting speech in 
order to provide adequate breathing room for the exercise of essential 
freedoms.250  The fact that Mr. Tam offended the public’s moral 
sensibilities merely demonstrates the expressive power of his band’s 
name, as well as the expressive power of trademarks generally.251 
In denying registration to “scandalous” or “disparaging” 
trademarks, § 1052(a) significantly abridges trademark applicants’ 
First Amendment rights.  Although the Spending Clause authorizes 
Congress to condition federal benefits upon the recipients’ 
relinquishment of rights under certain circumstances, § 1052(a) fails 
to meet these criteria.  That is because the provision is unduly coercive, 
 
goods; and providing registrants with access to federal district courts.  McGinley, 660 
F.2d at 486. 
 246  In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 583 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g 
en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. 
Ct. 30 (2016).   
 247  See, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d at 487 (Baldwin, J., dissenting). 
 248  See Elder Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 454, 477–78 (2014) (“Economic considerations by themselves—without 
the law’s intervention—could discourage use of offensive marks, as many customers 
would avoid purchasing an offensively marked product or service.”); Lee, supra note 
9, at 80 n.51 (“If a majority of the public is offended by a mark, [then] they are not 
likely . . . to buy the goods bearing that mark.  Therefore, it is not likely that anyone 
would use a mark that was truly offensive to a majority of the population.”).  
 249  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011). 
 250  See id. 
 251  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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and it fails to implicate federal funds to a constitutionally adequate 
degree.  As an abridgement of commercial speech, § 1052(a) must 
withstand intermediate scrutiny to pass muster.  The statute does not 
survive intermediate scrutiny, because the government has failed to 
articulate a substantial interest in regulating scandalous and 
disparaging material in this manner.  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
must invalidate § 1052(a) as unconstitutional. 
 
